Showing posts with label principle of party disposition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label principle of party disposition. Show all posts

Tuesday, 4 December 2018

G 0009/92 - "Non-appealing party" - #7

Citation rank: 7
No. of citations: 254

G 9/92 (in consolidated proceedings with G 4/93, see same review here) looked at the consequences of the "principle of party disposition" on inter partes opposition-appeal proceedings.

Two Boards of Appeal referred questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal under Art. 112(1)(a) EPC. The questions arose from three appeal cases, all of which were concerned with an appeal against the decision of an oppositon division to maintain the patent in amended form according to Art. 101(3)(a) EPC. In one case the proprietor was the sole appellant, in another case only the opponent appealed. In the third case both parties appealed.

The Technical Boards referred the question whether a Board of Appeal, in proceedings before it, could put the sole appellant in a worse position than if it had not appealed, or whether there should be prohibition of reformatio in peius (Latin: "change for the worse"). Specifically, they asked the Enlarged Board:
"Can the Board of Appeal amend a contested decision to the Appellant's disadvantage? -   If so, to what extent?"
The Enlarged Board pointed out that the proceedings before the EPO are generally goverened by the principle of party disposition, i.e., that the parties define the extent of the proceedings through their intial requests. This principle is also known as the principle of "ne ultra petita" (Latin: "not beyond the request").

The Enlarged Board mentioned that decisions G 9/91 and G 10/91 already clarified that the principle of party disposition applies to opposition and opposition-appeal proceedings before the EPO (see G 9/92, points 3 and 4 of the reasons). The principle of ex officio examination (Art. 114(1) EPC), on the other hand, found little application in appeal proceedings (points 4 and 5 of the reasons).

Under the principle of party disposition, in opposition-appeal cases in which the patent is maintained in amended form, the appeal of the proprietor, who is the sole appellant, can only be understood as a request of the proprietor-appellant to maintain its patent in unamended form, or at least with a scope somewhere between that of the patent upheld in opposition and the scope as granted. In any case, the proprietor's appeal cannot be interpreted as being a request to further limit the appellant's patent. Therefore, the Enlarged Board in G 9/92 found that it would be against the principle of party disposition to limit a patent to less than the scope maintained in opposition, if the proprietor is the sole appellant (see Headnote I).

Where the opponent is the sole appellant, the situation is the opposite. It would be against the principle of party disposition, if an Appeal Board broadened the scope of the patent (e.g., maintained the patent as granted). This would certainly be against the opponent/sole appellant's initial request. The proprietor is thus primarily restricted to defending the patent in the form in which it was maintained by the Opposition Division (see Headnote II).

If both, the proprietor and the opponent, appeal against the decision to uphold the patent in amended form, the principle of party disposition clearly can no longer be fully observed. This is impossible, because of the parties' initial requests are contradicting. In this situation, an Appeal Board is free to broaden or lessen the scope of the patent as mainteined by the opposition division all the way from maintenance as granted to revocation in full.

Remark: G 1/99 ("Reformatio in peius") later took a closer look at the situation in which the opponent is the sole appellant (Headnote II, below). G 1/99 exceptionally allowed broadening of the scope of the claims (beyond the scope of the claims maintained in opposition, but within the limits of Art. 123(3)) in the case where the proprietor would otherwise lose its patent because of a Art. 123(2) infringement which occurred during the opposition stage. The cautious wording "may be rejected as inadmissible by the Board of Appeal if they are neither appropriate nor necessary" in Headnote II, below, was thus interpreted as as allowing certain exceptions. See here for a brief summary of G 1/99.

---

Headnote:
I. If the patent proprietor is the sole appellant against an interlocutory decision maintaining a patent in amended form, neither the Board of Appeal nor the non-appealing opponent as a party to the proceedings as of right under Article 107, second sentence, EPC, may challenge the maintenance of the patent as amended in accordance with the interlocutory decision.
II. If the opponent is the sole appellant against an interlocutory decision maintaining a patent in amended form, the patent proprietor is primarily restricted during the appeal proceedings to defending the patent in the form in which it was maintained by the Opposition Division in its interlocutory decision. Amendments proposed by the patent proprietor as a party to the proceedings as of right under Article 107, second sentence, EPC, may be rejected as inadmissible by the Board of Appeal if they are neither appropriate nor necessary.
The full text of the decision can be found here.

Thursday, 25 October 2018

G 0001/99 - Reformatio in peius - #22

Citation rank: 22
No. of citations: 161

Further to G 4/93 (and G 9/92), G 1/99 also looks at the consequences of the principle of party disposition, namely the prohibition of reformatio in peius, in opposition-appeal proceedings where the Opposition Division has upheld the patent in amended form.

G 4/93 held that in such cases, if the proprietor is the sole appellant, neither the Board nor the non-appealing opponent may challenge the maintenance of the patent in amended form (G 4/93, Headnote I)

In the case where the opponent is the sole appellant, G 4/93 held that the proprietor is primarily restricted to defending the patent in the form in which it was maintained by the Opposition Division. Amendments proposed by the patent proprietor, however, may be rejected as inadmissible by the Board "if they are neither appropriate nor necessary" (G 4/93, Headnote II; see here for a brief summary of G 4/93).

G 1/99 now takes a closer look at the latter situation, where the opponent is the sole appellant. In particular, G 1/99 explains how the expression "... if they are neither appropriate nor necessary" in Headnote II of G 4/93 is to be understood.

The Enlarged Board in G 1/99 generally confirmed that the principle of party disposition, and thus the prohibition of reformtio in peius, applies under the EPC (see point 8 of the reasons). However, the principle is not to be applied unconditionally. They stated:
"... Taking into consideration that in appeal proceedings before the EPO the application of the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius derives from its own case law, the Enlarged Board of Appeal has also to weigh the consequences of this application, if it appears that they might be unsatisfactory." (point 11 of the reasons)
They considered that in the case where the opponent is the sole appellant against a decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent in amended form, it would be inappropriate not to allow the proprietor to amend his claims, if such amendment is necessary to undo an Art. 123(2) violation, which occurred during the opposition procedure, and which was allowed by the Opposition Division. Such amendments are to be allowed, even if it meant that the opponent and sole appellant is put is a worse situation than if he had not appealed, i.e., even if the opponent is thereby hit by reformatio in peius. In such situations, reformatio in peius was exceptionally allowed.

The Enlarged Board, however, did not allow any type of amendment. In order to restrict the negative effect of the amendment on the opponent to a minimum, the Enlarged Board held that in such a case, the proprietor may, in this order,
  1. amend the claims by introducing one or more originally disclosed features which limit the scope of the patent as maintained (in this situation the opponent and sole appellant does not suffer from reformatio in peius);
  2. If this is not possible, amend the claims by introducing one or more originally disclosed features which extend the scope of the patent as maintained, but of course not extending beyond the scope of the patent as granted (Art. 123(3) (here reformatio in peius occurs);
  3. If amendments under 1 and 2 are not possible, the proprietor may delete the feature which led to the Art. 123(2) infringement, but within the limits of Article 123(3) EPC (here reformatio in peius is even worse).
Generally, the prohibition of reformatio in peius is more strictly applied in cases where the proprietor is the sole appellant, as compared to where the opponent is the sole appellant. The Enlarged Board considered this "un-symmetrical" application of the principle of reformatio in peius justified, i.a., because a losing opponent has further opportunity to invalidate the European patent in national invalidity proceedings, whereas a proprietor, who's patent is revoked in opposition/appeal proceedings before the EPO, has lost its patent for good.

---

Headnote:
In principle, an amended claim, which would put the opponent and sole appellant in a worse situation than if it had not appealed, must be rejected. However, an exception to this principle may be made in order to meet an objection put forward by the opponent/appellant or the Board during the appeal proceedings, in circumstances where the patent as maintained in amended form would otherwise have to be revoked as a direct consequence of an inadmissible amendment held allowable by the Opposition Division in its interlocutory decision.
In such circumstances, in order to overcome the deficiency, the patent proprietor/respondent may be allowed to file requests, as follows:
- in the first place, for an amendment introducing one or more originally disclosed features which limit the scope of the patent as maintained;
- if such a limitation is not possible, for an amendment introducing one or more originally disclosed features which extend the scope of the patent as maintained, but within the limits of Article 123(3) EPC;
- finally, if such amendments are not possible, for deletion of the inadmissible amendment, but within the limits of Article 123(3) EPC.
The full text of the decision can be found here.

Quotes from decisions citing G 1/99 can be found here.

Tuesday, 23 October 2018

G 0004/93 - "Non-appealing party" - #23

Citation rank: 23
No. of citations: 146

G 4/93 (in consolidated proceedings with G 9/92, see same review here) looked at the consequences of the "principle of party disposition" on inter partes opposition-appeal proceedings.

Two Boards of Appeal referred questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal under Art. 112(1)(a) EPC. The questions arose from three appeal cases, all of which were concerned with an appeal against the decision of an oppositon division to maintain the patent in amended form according to Art. 101(3)(a) EPC. In one case the proprietor was the sole appellant, in another case only the opponent appealed. In the third case both parties appealed.

The Technical Boards referred the question whether a Board of Appeal, in proceedings before it, could put the sole appellant in a worse position than if it had not appealed, or whether there should be prohibition of reformatio in peius (Latin: "change for the worse"). Specifically, they asked the Enlarged Board:
"Can the Board of Appeal amend a contested decision to the Appellant's disadvantage? -   If so, to what extent?"
The Enlarged Board pointed out that the proceedings before the EPO are generally goverened by the principle of party disposition, i.e., that the parties define the extent of the proceedings through their intial requests. This principle is also known as the principle of "ne ultra petita" (Latin: "not beyond the request").

The Enlarged Board mentioned that decisions G 9/91 and G 10/91 already clarified that the principle of party disposition applies to opposition and opposition-appeal proceedings before the EPO (see G 4/93, points 3 and 4 of the reasons). The principle of ex officio examination (Art. 114(1) EPC), on the other hand, found little application in appeal proceedings (points 4 and 5 of the reasons).

Under the principle of party disposition, in opposition-appeal cases in which the patent is maintained in amended form, the appeal of the proprietor, who is the sole appellant, can only be understood as a request of the proprietor-appellant to maintain its patent in unamended form, or at least with a scope somewhere between that of the patent upheld in opposition and the scope as granted. In any case, the proprietor's appeal cannot be interpreted as being a request to further limit the appellant's patent. Therefore, the Enlarged Board in G 4/93 found that it would be against the principle of party disposition to limit a patent to less than the scope maintained in opposition, if the proprietor is the sole appellant (see Headnote I).

Where the opponent is the sole appellant, the situation is the opposite. It would be against the principle of party disposition, if an Appeal Board broadened the scope of the patent (e.g., maintained the patent as granted). This would certainly be against the opponent/sole appellant's initial request. The proprietor is thus primarily restricted to defending the patent in the form in which it was maintained by the Opposition Division (see Headnote II).

If both, the proprietor and the opponent, appeal against the decision to uphold the patent in amended form, the principle of party disposition clearly can no longer be fully observed. This is impossible, because of the parties' initial requests are contradicting. In this situation, an Appeal Board is free to broaden or lessen the scope of the patent as mainteined by the opposition division all the way from maintenance as granted to revocation in full.

Remark: G 1/99 ("Reformatio in peius") later took a closer look at the situation in which the opponent is the sole appellant (Headnote II, below). G 1/99 exceptionally allowed broadening of the scope of the claims (beyond the scope of the claims maintained in opposition, but within the limits of Art. 123(3)) in the case where the proprietor would otherwise lose its patent because of a Art. 123(2) infringement which occurred during the opposition stage. The cautious wording "may be rejected as inadmissible by the Board of Appeal if they are neither appropriate nor necessary" in Headnote II, below, was thus interpreted as as allowing certain exceptions. See here for a brief summary of G 1/99.
---

Headnote:
I. If the patent proprietor is the sole appellant against an interlocutory decision maintaining a patent in amended form, neither the Board of Appeal nor the non-appealing opponent as a party to the proceedings as of right under Article 107, second sentence, EPC, may challenge the maintenance of the patent as amended in accordance with the interlocutory decision.
II. If the opponent is the sole appellant against an interlocutory decision maintaining a patent in amended form, the patent proprietor is primarily restricted during the appeal proceedings to defending the patent in the form in which it was maintained by the Opposition Division in its interlocutory decision. Amendments proposed by the patent proprietor as a party to the proceedings as of right under Article 107, second sentence, EPC, may be rejected as inadmissible by the Board of Appeal if they are neither appropriate nor necessary.
The full text of the decision can be found here.